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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

-ciA/oci/sR 0363/69B.

MICROFILMED

WEEKLY SUMMARY

Special Report

Kremlin and Scientists: Dependence and Disaffection

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ARCHIVAL RECORD PLEASE RETURN TO AGENCY ARCHIVES, BLDG. A-18 Secret

Nº 724

28 March 1969 No. 0363/69B

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KREMLIN AND SCIENTISTS: DEPENDENCE AND DISAFFECTION

The scientific intelligentsia in the Soviet Union, because of its value to the state and its tendency to disaffection, occupies a unique position in Soviet society. Over the past year Soviet leaders have emphasized the importance of the work of scientists and technologists in keeping the nation's economy moving. At the same time the scientific community has expressed, with a fuller voice than ever before, its disapproval of the methods and the policies of the present political regime.

The scientists, in championing the causes of the liberal cultural intelligentsia, appear to be a force for liberalization in the Soviet Union. Their future influence, however, will be colored also by their dedication to modernization and their own sense of elitism. Authorities have used a variety of measures to stille most open expressions of dissent by scientists and others, but seem, nevertheless, at a loss to deal with the attitudes that prompted the outburst. The regime will be under growing pressure to react more responsively to the interests of this vital segment of society.

Soviet leaders are counting more heavily than ever on science and technology to provide the levers for further economic growth. Party leader Brezhnev, in a major speech last December, said that "the central economic task" was to find and activate these levers. Minister of Finance Garbuzov and chairman of the State Planning Committee Baybakov in effect told the Supreme Soviet earlier in December that the growth targets for 1969 are largely based on an assumed increase in scientific and technical progress. Eighty percent of the planned increase in industrial output, Garbuzov said, depends on the growth of labor productivity. To achieve this, Baybakov noted, requires broad application of technology to production, and better management.

Soviet leaders recognize that the returns on labor and capital have declined substantially since the 1950s. They realize that a faster rate of technical progress is the key to restoring the previous rates of growth of productivity and gross national product. Vadim Trapeznikov, first deputy chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology, claims that a ruble increases the national income by 39 kopeks if invested in productive capacity, but increases it by 1 ruble and 45 kopeks if invested in research and development. Trapeznikov and other officials claim that there would be still greater benefits if research were tied more closely to production problems and if the results were carried over into production more quickly.

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NEW DECREE ON SCIENCE


The government issued a decree in October 1968 that aims at achieving greater benefits from research. It seeks to expand research work in high priority fields on the basis of long-term forecasts, and calls for more cooperation between research institutes and industry.

The decree introduced a system of material incentives, that became effective in selected research institutes on an experimental basis on 1 January 1969. Under this system, both the institutes and their employees will be rewarded in proportion to the profits that their innovations earn for industry. The work of scientific organiza-

tions is to be reviewed every three years, with a shake-up facing those failing to measure up. Competitive ratings of all scientific workers will be made triennially, and promotion, demotion, or dismissal will be based on the ratings. Scientists will enjoy more freedom from administrative controls in their work, but the results of their work—and therefore their own positions—will be evaluated according to economic and practical, rather than scientific and professional criteria.

BUREAUCRACY IS A STUMBLING BLOCK

The research and development decree, even though economically justified, still leaves many problems unsolved. A swollen and rigid



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bureaucracy still stands in the way of moving innovations from drawing board to production line. On the producers' side, moreover, there remain many counterincentives to the employment of new processes. Adopting them could interrupt current production and threaten plan fulfillment, and their initial cost is likely to cut the enterprise's profits. For this reason the decree cannot of itself be expected to go far in solving problems of technological advance in industry. It is likely to lead to frustration, especially among the scientists who are being burdened with the major responsibility for progress in this area.

A real solution of these problems would require reforms in the direction of a market economy which would raise serious ideological and political questions. Allowing a more direct role for profits and prices in stimulating innovation would circumvent the bureaucracy; consequently proposals along this line have raised fears among party and government leaders. Having ruled out such substantial reform, the Soviet leaders seem to have become more reliant on the scientists and the miracles they can work to assure future economic expansion, even though the scientific community is not considered a bastion of unquestioning allegiance.

NONCONFORMITY AND PASSIVITY AMONG THE SCIENTISTS

The regime's dismay over the attitudes of many scientists is unmistakable. An article in the ideological journal of the party Central Committee, Kommunist, last December makes this very clear. The author charged scientists at Obninsk, a nuclear research center 60 miles southwest of Moscow, with displaying "a lack of a class approach to the evaluation of capitalist reality" and "a feeling of exclusiveness and snobbism."

Last fall the conservative newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya charged the scientists at Obninsk

with political and ideological apathy. It claimed that the party organization there had been conducting its political work "without spirit, and divorced from international and domestic events." While party workers and scientists looked on "passively, like outside observers...some people, unhindered, spread views alien to the party." The House of Scientists, it was alleged, for a long time hosted no lectures on current politics, political economy, or philosophy, "but the platform was readily granted to dubious people who preached incorrect views on the development of literature and the arts." One of these "dubious people" reportedly was novelist Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who was invited to read some of his works at Obninsk. His appearance was prohibited by special party order.

Soviet officials are worried about the unwholesome attitudes of scientists all the more because of the growing number and concentration of them. A party official in the Leningrad area exposed this concern in an article last October in Sovetskaya Rossiya. He noted that 20 percent of the working population of Leningrad is employed in research and design organizations and schools. In a recent survey in Leningrad only 55.5 percent of the scientists and specialists questioned said they consider community work their civic duty, and 12 percent said they do it unwillingly. Thousands of these scientists and engineers are concentrated in major research and design institutes, which develop their own "climate," according to the article. Here the number of passivists runs 20 to 30 percent more than normal. As a rule, it was said, these passivists are under 35 and are frustrated by their lengthy status as trainees.

NOVOSIBIRSK SCIENCE CITY

Of the several large scientific communities established by the government, the one near Novosibirsk is the most impressive. Called Akademgorodok, it is a fairly new center,


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established in 1957. It is the headquarters of the Siberian Department of the Academy of Sciences (SOAN) and the home of the Novosibirsk State University. A planned scientific community, it now has 40,000 residents, and is modeled after complexes at Stanford, Princeton, and Cambridge. Design bureaus are being built near Akademgorodok to take advantage of the expertise found in the institutes and to make it easier to translate the institutes' discoveries into production results.

Residents admit to a sense of freedom in Akademgorodok, in part because they are some



Akademgorodok at Novosibirsk: Science and Mathematics Complex and House of Scholars.

2,000 miles from Moscow. Western visitors confirm that there is such an attitude in the community. In the absence of the usual pressures for conformity, there is a stimulating and vital intellectual life. This includes regular public lectures on provocative topics and exhibits of modern art and concerts of modern music at the House of Scholars.

The scientists appear to be in charge of affairs, and party influence remains in the background. This has produced some town-and-gown friction with residents of the nearby city of Novosibirsk. Scholars who are invited there to speak manage sometimes to rub the dogmas of the townsfolk the wrong way, reputedly eliciting such ardent protests as this: "Your Akademgorodok scientists don't know their Marx and give upsetting lectures at the frangipani factory." So far the party has limited its response to admonishing the Siberian Department to have the scholars confine their controversial opinions to Akademgorodok.

PROTESTS AND PETITIONS

The scientists have been just as outspoken on the national level. In 1966, some outstanding men of science including V. A. Engelhardt, P. L. Kapitsa, M. A. Leontovich, A. D. Sakharov, and I. Ye. Tamm, together with some bright lights of the cultural world, lent their names to two petitions. These challenged the authorities on the



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question of rehabilitating Stalin and on enacting a new law on anti-Soviet "slander."

By 1968, the pattern of protest showed a change. During the year a succession of petitions appeared in protest against the trial in January of underground writers Aleksandr Ginsburg and Yury Galanskov. The signers were mostly young and obscure members of the cultural and scientific community.

By the end of April over 20 documents had become available in the West relating to the trial and to the arrest of a prominent protestor, the mathematician Aleksandr Yesenin-Volpin. Over half of the signers were identified as professional people in the fields of mathematics and science of all ranks: academicians, professors, teachers, researchers, students, technicians. Most of the signers were from Moscow, with the not surprising exception of some forty scientists from the Novosibirsk Akademgorodok.

The protestors pressed for redress of their grievances, calling on the authorities to live up to the constitution and the laws of the land. They called for effective machinery and political will to carry out the constitutional guarantees, due process of law through open and speedy trials, impartial selection of witnesses, full public disclosure of court proceedings, and public control of the courts. They also demanded protection of civil rights, and especially the right of dissent and the creation of honest and independent information media. Many of the documents specifically criticized the secret police and warned against returning to the arbitrary rule and oppression of Stalin's day.

SCIENCE'S COMMON GROUND WITH THE HUMANITIES

Behind these particular demands lies the fundamental issue of freedom of information, a cause

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After all, discussion is in itself dialectic. The truth is born in the clash of opposites. Whenever in science there are no opposites, no struggles, then it is on the road to the cemetery, it is going to bury itself. It is easier to ignore your opponent than to argue with him, but to turn away from him, not to know him, to "close him down" means to damage science, truth and society.... Young people must learn skillful polemics from their grandfathers who made the revolution. At that time oratory was a lofty art, because at times everything depended on the word.

Petr Kapitsa, interview in Youth No. 1, 1967

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But freedom of thought is under a triple threat in modern society—from the opium of mass culture, from cowardly, egotistic and narrow-minded ideologies and from the ossified dogmatism of a bureaucratic oligarchy and its favorite weapon, ideological censorship. Therefore, freedom of thought requires the defense of all thinking and honest people.

Andrey Sakharov, essay received July 1968

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Today the key to a progressive restructuring of the system of government in the interests of mankind lies in intellectual freedom. This has been understood, in particular, by the Czechoslovaks and there can be no doubt that we should support their bold initiative, which is so valuable for the future of socialism and mankind.

Andrey Sakharov, essay received July 1968

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that unites the interests of both the scientific and the cultural intelligentsia. A. D. Sakharov, distinguished physicist-academician, in an essay that appeared in the West in July 1968, stressed "that censorship problems (in the broad meaning of the word) have been one of the central questions in the ideological struggle of recent years." Such plaints are a measure of the losses that the liberals have suffered under the present regime. The relatively wide-ranging discussion of political and social issues, in the period of de-Stalinization under Khrushchev, has now been reduced to appeals for the right of discussion itself.

Petr Kapitsa, the world-famous physicist, and Sakharov both argue that freedom of inquiry and expression is essential to the advance of science and the preservation of the human race. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Aleksandr Tvardovsky, editor of the progressive literary journal, Novy Mir, continue to battle with the Union of Writers against censorship and for the publication of Solzhenitsyn's novels, proceeding on the basis of cultural and moral principles.



Crowd awaits verdict for demonstrators who protested the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Those tried included Pavel Litvinov, physicist and grandson of former Soviet foreign minister, and Larisa Daniel, former wife of imprisoned writer Yuly Daniel.

REACTION TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia has further sharpened the critical attitudes of the scientists. Westerners in contact with Soviet scientists at international conferences since Czechoslovakia have found all shades of reaction to the invasion: full support, support that turned to uneasiness as more of the facts were learned, public support and private misgivings, neutrality ("All I'm interested in is heat transfer and gas dynamics."), embarrassment, apology, and outright condemnation.

Clearly supporters of the invasion were a minority. An American physicist reported in October, after a 21-day tour of physics laboratories in the Baltic capitals, Moscow, Kiev, Kharkov, Yerevan, and Leningrad, that the Soviet scientists at all of the institutes were "dismayed" over the Czech affair. A professor at the Novosibirsk Akademgorodok said that his colleagues there became somewhat more nervous and cautious than usual after both the invasion and the trial of five persons, including Pavel Litvinov and Larisa Daniel, who demonstrated against it in Moscow.

For some of the scientists the invasion raised fears of war, for others worry over a crackdown at home and limitations on travel. For the really disaffected it confirmed all their dark judgments about the Soviet leadership. Many Soviet scientists identified the Czechoslovak reforms with the general cause of intellectual freedom. This was made clear in Sakharov's declaration and in the conviction expressed by other Soviet citizens that the Kremlin acted out of fear of an end to censorship in Czechoslovakia.

A STAND-OFF

As the protest movement in the Soviet Union has come to center on the legal right of dissent under the constitution, the regime has adopted a policy which might be termed "legalistic repression." It has tried to eliminate dissent

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
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while maintaining legal forms, and not by blatant use of "popular" justice, arbitrary rule, or terror.

In commentary at the time of the Ginsburg-Galanskov trial in January 1968 two eminent jurists appeared to be claiming in the press that the suppression of underground intellectuals was not a mandate to dispense with legal formalities in coping with dissent. On the other hand, an article by a party ideologist in Pravda on 2 October emphasized that the Soviet state and its repressive machinery, including the courts and the police, were still needed in order to prevent "relaxation of public order and disruption of the normal life of society." This line was borne out in the decision by the Supreme Soviet on 28 November to change the name of the Ministry for the Preservation of Public Order (MOOP) back to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), a symbol of Stalinist repression, and to strengthen the internal police forces.

Within this sort of framework authorities during the past three years have meted out stiff sentences to dissidents in more than a half-dozen trials in Moscow and Leningrad. They have generally chosen to prosecute members of a hardcore group of agitators. They have singled out obscure people in an attempt not to arouse the public, as well as persons involved in demonstrations and underground literary efforts, to assure an excuse for legal proceedings. Public protests over these affairs have met with warnings from the KGB, pressure applied at places of employment, and loss of privileges or of party or professional membership. The illegal use of police power was evident in the case of Yesenin-Volpin, who was confined for a time last spring to a mental institution.

The message behind the trials has been reinforced by the campaign for ideological vigilance launched by Brezhnev in a speech to the party



M. V. Keldysh opens meeting of the Academy of Sciences, 1966

Central Committee last April. Soviet authorities have invoked "a sharpening of the ideological struggle" in the world as the rationale for this campaign, with Czechoslovakia offered as the case in point. They have called on the party to strengthen its control and its ideological work in all institutions, but especially those concerned with youth and cultural affairs, and to cleanse the press of subversive "bourgeois" influences.

The scientific community has not been able to escape the disciplinary hand of the party in these circumstances, but the hand has been relatively lightly applied. The protests over the Ginsburg-Galanskov trial and the detention of Yescnin-Volpin reached all the way up in the scientific establishment to the family of M. V. Keldysh, the president of the Academy of Sciences. His sister Lyudmila, her husband Petr Novikov (member of the Academy), and their son Sergey Novikov (corresponding member) were among the protest

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signers. In apparent retaliation for their indiscretion, authorities canceled a visit to the US planned by Lyudmila and Petr in March. Instances were reported of warnings issued to other petitioners, of forced recantations, and of loss of party membership.

In a speech at the Moscow City party conference in March 1968 where Brezhnev laid down the ideological law, President Keldysh deplored the failings of his fellow scientists, but implied that the Academy would put its own house in order. Rumors abounded that the regime was displeased with Keldysh, and elections to the Academy were delayed from July until November, reportedly because of the protests.

Nevertheless, both Sakharov and Yesenin-Volpin attended an international scientific conference in Tbilisi in September, quite unsubdued. According to a participant, Sakharov spoke freely against the intervention in Czechoslovakia, and Yesenin-Volpin declared that most scientists felt that repression of the intellectuals and conditions in general in the USSR were worse than under Khrushchev.

The elections to the Academy took place on 26 November. Members of the Novosibirsk Akademgorodok seem to have won a good share of seats. Contrary to fears of drastic repressive measures following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, a professor at Novosibirsk admitted that the scientists had actually been treated with kid gloves by the authorities.

TRIED-AND-FAILED SOLUTIONS

Some aspects of the decree on research and development will have a political impact on the scientists. Both the enhanced powers of the State Committee and the emphasis on practical results in research will make the Academy of Sciences and its institutes less independent and aloof. In

addition, commissions composed of representatives of the party and trade unions as well as scientists will carry out the triennial certification of scientists at institutes and schools. Whatever the "objective criteria" developed for these examinations, the membership of the commissions suggests that they will judge the "whole man" rather than just his work.

The party prescribes "closeness to the workers" as a standard cure for any group in which it detects political or ideological defects. The Leningrad official writing in Sovetskaya Rossiya said that it is "particularly important" to strengthen ties between the party organizations of research and design institutions and those of factories. The provisions in the decree for bringing "branch institutions closer to production," as well as the provisions raising the salaries of factory specialists to equal the salaries of scientific personnel at institutes, can be regarded as a means of social discipline. In a more obvious exemple, the Central Trade Union Council decided in January 1969 to expand the "people's universities," which employ scientists and engineers, usually without pay, to lecture to factory and office workers after hours.

Press commentators have not put forward any more convincing recommendations for improving the attitudes of the scientists. Even the article in the authoritative Kommunist was long on criticism but short on answers. A party secretary in Obninsk responded last fall to the attacks on conditions there with an article in Party Life, journal of the Central Committee. Instead of calling for strict enforcement of discipline, he offered only a hackneyed recital of the merits of theoretical seminars and club lectures, more intensive work by political information officers, and improvements in the local newspaper. The "triedand-failed" character of these measures and the low level on which they are being advanced suggest that the party leadership is essentially at a

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loss for ways to solve the problem. Indeed, Sovet-skaya Rossiya closed its discussion of the subject in February with an article by a distinguished scientist who contradicted much of the previous commentary. I. I. Artobolevsky said that surveys "convincingly disprove prevailing ideas concerning the political passivity of young scientific workers" and that the manner of participating in public affairs should be left to the scientists themselves.

IMPLICATIONS

The crisis of the party is the loss of its dynamic role in Soviet society. For years the best minds have spurned the discipline and ideological demands of party work to make their careers in the fields of science. These specialists have become vital to the operation of the economy as it has grown in sophistication and complexity. Naturally, they respect officials who share their own technical expertise, and their flexible approach to problems—the prerequisites for success in their professions. They therefore tend to look up to experts within the government apparatus who have these qualifications—to men at the level of minister and deputy minister—such as Kosygin and Kirillin.

An example is Zh. A. Medvedev, a biologist concerned with the process of aging who works at the Institute of Medical Radiology in Obninsk. He is a friend of Dzherman Gvishiani, Kosygin's sonin-law and deputy chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology under Kirillin.
Nevertheless, the party has interrupted
Medvedev's works and has denied him travel outside the USSR. His remarks on the role of the
party are incisive: "This almost 15th-century
system from the lowest to the top level is the
most shameful survival of past distrust in people,
and I hope very much that this system, as any
other thing in this world that ages, will die in
time. And I hope that my own aging will be a
little slower than the aging of this distrust."

The scientists are unique as a group in Soviet society because of their value to the production program of the state, on the one hand, and their tendency to estrangement from the policies of the state, on the other. The cultural intelligentsia is, on the whole, more disaffected, but the authorities can live with sterility in the arts. The championing of the causes of intellectual freedom and civil liberties by elements of the scientific intelligentsia suggests that the specialists will prove to be a force for liberalization. Scientists are also devoted to modernization and progress, however, and in the Russian context of backwardness, such a program has always meant regimentation. In any case, the scientists will be bringing more pressure on the regime to act responsively in their interests. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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